Secure transmission over satellite phone network

ABSTRACT

A reach back secure communications terminal includes a modem to satellite interconnect board that captures DTMF tones, demodulates encrypted modem information, and converts both into an ASCII string for presentation to a data port of a satellite phone, allowing out-of-band control of a non-secure satellite system (e.g., AT command control of a data port) by a user on a secure side of an encryption device, by including the ability to interpret control signals and control the satellite system appropriately. A false dial tone is presented to the encryption device, and the data stream coming from the encryption device is monitored for the presence of dual-tone, multi-frequency (DTMF) tones representing control signals, the DTMF tones are converted to ASCII characters, which are in turn received as control signals by the satellite phone, allowing control of the functions of the satellite system directly from the secure side of the encryption device.

The present application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.11/135,397, entitled “Secure Transmission Over Satellite Phone Network”,filed on May 24, 2005 now U.S. Pat. No. 7,761,095; which in turn is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/008,596, entitled“Reach-Back Communications Terminal With Selectable Networking Options”,filed Dec. 10, 2004; which in turn claims priority from U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 60/553,547, entitled “Portable Remote Access Reach-BackCommunications Terminal”, filed Mar. 17, 2004.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

This invention relates generally to computer and communication networks.More specifically, it relates to a portable reach-back communicationssystem that provides extremely flexible secure or non-secure voice,video and data services to a remote user.

2. Background of the Related Art

In 1970, the Secure Telephone Unit (STU-I) was developed, followed in1975 by the STU-II, and finally in 1987 by the third generation STU-III.

The STU-III terminals are designed to operate as either an ordinarytelephone or a secure instrument over a dial-up public switchedtelephone network (PSTN). The STU-III operates in full-duplex over asingle telephone circuit using echo canceling modem technology.Typically, STU-IIIs come equipped with 2.4 and 4.8 kbps code-excitedlinear prediction (CELP) secure voice. Secure data can be transmitted atspeeds of 2.4, 4.8 and 9.6 kbps, though data throughput between twoSTU-IIIs is only as great as the slowest STU-III.

A STU-III operates by taking an audio signal and digitizing it into aserial data stream, which is then mixed with a keying stream of datacreated by an internal ciphering algorithm. This mixed data is thenpassed through a COder-DECoder (CODEC) to convert it back to audio so itcan be passed over the phone line. STU-IIIs also allow a serial datastream to pass through the phone and into the ciphering engine to allowits usage as an encrypted modem when not used for voice.

The keying stream is a polymorphic regenerating mathematic algorithmwhich takes an initialization key and mathematically morphs it into abit stream pattern. The keying stream is created by the key generator,and is the heart of the STU-III. A portion of the keying stream is thenmixed back into the original key, and the process is repeated. Theresult is a pseudo-random bit stream that if properly implemented isextremely difficult to decrypt. Even the most sophisticatedcryptographic algorithm can be easily expressed in the form of a simpleequation in Boolean algebra, with the initialization keys being used todefine the initial key generator settings, and to provide morphing backto the equation.

While STU-III provides secure communications, audio quality was vastlyimproved with the development of purely digital Standard TelephoneEquipment (STE) devices.

An STE device utilizes an ISDN digital telephone line connection. Thereis substantial improvement in voice quality using an STE as opposed tothe STU-III used over analog telephone lines. Most STE devices areSTU-III secure mode compatible with enhanced abilities includingvoice-recognition quality secure voice communication, and high-speedsecure data transfers (up to 38.4 kbps for asynchronous or 128 kbps forsynchronous data transfers). When connected to an analog telephone line,an STE unit will only support STU-III voice and data capabilities.

The STU-III and STE are quite useful in fixed use, i.e., in an officeenvironment or perhaps carried to another location having access toanalog or digital telephone line access.

FIG. 22 is a depiction of a conventional fragmented securecommunications network.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 22, a network backbone 1800 allowsvarious like devices to securely connect to each other. The networkbackbone 1800 includes such communication networks as ISDN TDM, ATM andIP. Devices that can connect to the network backbone 1800 include anISDN telephone 1810, a voice-over-IP computer terminal 1820, avoice-over-IP telephone 1830, TRI-TAC & MSE devices 1840, cellulartelephones 1850, communicating using various standards including CDMA,GSM, TDMA and iDEN. Other devices that can connect to the networkbackbone 1800 include tactical digital radios 1850, analog cellulartelephones 1860, satellite communications 1870, a dial-up computerterminal 1880, and a public switched telephone network telephone 1890.

In operation, each of the devices transmitting data to the networkbackbone 1800 must encrypt their respective data streams. Each of thedevices receiving data from the network backbone 1800 must un-encrypttheir respective data streams.

A conventional vocoder for use with the network backbone 1800 is theMixed-Excitation Linear Predictive (MELP) vocoder. The MELP vocoder is adual-rate low rate coder that operates at 1200 bits-per-second (bps) and2400 bps. The MELP vocoder meets military standard MIL-STD-3005 and NATOSTANAG 4591.

FNBDT (Type 1 Future NarrowBand Digital Terminal) is an acronym thatcorresponds to Digital Secure Voice Protocol (DSVP) transport layer andabove. DSVP operates over most data and voice network configurationswith a Least Common Denominator for interoperability. DSVP interoperateswith many media including wireless, satellite, IP and cellular. DSVPadapts to the data rate of the connection, with modems training down.DSVP negotiates security/application features with application topoint-to-point communications and multi-point communications. DSVPsupports realtime, near realtime and non-realtime applications.

FIG. 23 is a depiction of a conventional combination wired and wirelesscommunication network supporting secure communications. Secure operationrequires wireless circuit switched data service and use of a datatelephone number.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 23, a combination wired and wirelesscommunication network comprises various analog and digital communicationnetworks 1900, such as PSTN 1901, analog communication networks 1902 anddigital communication networks 1903. Devices connecting to the variousanalog and digital communication networks 1900 include mobile satelliteservice devices 1910 connecting to a satellite service 1911, e.g.,Iridium, Globalstar and ICO. The mobile satellite service devices 1910communicate through a Iridium satellite system. Further devicesconnecting to the various analog and digital communication networks 1900include STE 1920, digital cellular telephones 1930 using, e.g., GSMstandards, digital cellular telephones 1940 connecting to a CDMAnetwork. A tactical MSE/TRI-TAC network 1950 allows various devices toconnect to the various communication networks 1900. Devices connectingto the tactical MSE/TRI-TAC network 1950 are, e.g., JTR 1952, deployableLMR 1954 and cellular tactical STE 1956. The tactical MSE/TRI-TACnetwork 1950 can connect to a CDMA network. A STU-III 1970 and analogcellular telephone 1972, e.g., CipherTAC 2000, connect to the analognetwork 1902.

In operation, CDMA communications occur at 800 Mhz over CONUS approvednetworks, such as Verizon and ALLTEL. GSM communications occur at 850Mhz and 1900 Mhz over CONUS approved networks, such as T-Mobile andAT&T. OCONUS European GSM 900 MHz and 1800 MHz, many are approved basedon commercial approval of TimeportII GSM phone within SECTERA-GSM secureterminal.

Any of the communication devices of FIG. 23 can obtain a secure voiceconnection with any secure, like communication device.

FIG. 24 is a depiction of a conventional deployable secure communicationsystem utilizing a satellite communication network.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 24, a secure encryption STE 700 withsuitable interface hardware is utilized to provide a connection path toa wireless connection to a similarly secure STE via a satellitetransceiver 914, e.g., an Inmarsat M4 terminal. In the conventionalsystem of FIG. 24, an ISDN link is utilized between the STE 700 and asuitable satellite two-way communication transceiver and antenna 914.

In operation, voice data is encrypted by the STE 700, and transmitted ina secure environment over a physically secure satellite, e.g., the M4INMARSAT satellite transceiver 914.

It is vitally important that the STE 700 stay physically secured, tomaximize protection of the information being passed thereover. Also, tofurther maximize protection of the information, the satellitetransceiver 914 is conventionally set up and maintained within a secureenvironment, and usually travels with the STE 700.

Conventional systems are typically physically large, e.g., the size of avan. More importantly, such conventional systems require all elements tobe maintained in a secure environment, including the data transportsystem (e.g., satellite communication system) over which the datatravels to another secure communications terminal. Such secure datatransport systems are costly to install and maintain, and always run arisk of being compromised.

FIG. 25 is a depiction of a conventional CDMA to GSM secure call setup.

In particular, before two-party secure voice traffic starts, FNBDT CallSetup Application messages are exchanged using an FNBDT ApplicationReliable Transport and Message Layer Protocols.

FIG. 26 is a depiction of a conventional FNBDT example call.

In particular, FNBDT secure voice & data may be sent over may networksegments. The connection shown use CDMA, PSTN and GSM networks.

The prior art uses a plurality of different devices, one for connectionto each network that a user desires to connect with. Thus, there is aneed for a small, lightweight, easily portable and easily deployablecommunication system that is not only even more secure than conventionalsystems, but which also allows flexibility in use of non-secure datatransport systems.

Such conventional secure systems are typically physically large but moreimportantly allow for only direct secure connection communicationbetween a remote user and a like receiver to maintain security in thecommunications. While this is quite useful in many situations, onlylimited communications are possible in a direct connection. Forinstance, direct, secure connectivity does not also allow access tonon-secure public communication systems, e.g., the Internet.

There is a need for a small, lightweight, and extremely flexible andadaptable communications terminal capable of quick, convenient and easyuse with a multitude of network environments, and for a deployablecommunication system that is not only more secure than conventionalsystems, but which also allows flexibility in use of non-secure datatransport systems.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with the principles of the present invention, an interfacefor use between an encryption device and a satellite phone comprises amodem interface, and a DTMF conversion to ASCII module receiving a datastream from the modem interface. The DTMF conversion is adapted toremove in-band control signaling from the data stream, and to presentthe control signaling out-of-band to a data port of the satellite phone.

A method of providing control signals from a user on a secure end of anencryption device to a non-secure data network in accordance withanother aspect of the present invention, comprises monitoring an in-banddata stream for presence of a DTMF tone. The DTMF tone received in-bandfrom said encryption device is decoded. The DTMF tones are decoded intoASCII control information. The ASCII control information is presentedout-of-band to the non-secure data network.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a combination wired and wireless communication networksupporting secure communications including a reach-back communicationsnetwork, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 2A shows a front panel view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 2B shows a top panel view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 2C shows a top/rear view of the reach-back communications terminal,in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 2D(1) shows a rear cut-away view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 2D(2) shows a base cut-away view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 3 shows an exemplary configuration for a reach-back communicationsterminal configured for access to a WAN, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 4 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishvoice communications through a PSTN network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 5 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishdata communications through a PSTN network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 6 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishvoice communications through a PBX network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 6A depicts a digital PBX connection with a PBX base unit, thehandset of the PBX base unit, and a PSTN common bus/circuit switchconnected in turn to an encryption unit, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 7 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishdata communications through a PBX network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 8 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishvoice communications through a GSM network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 9 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishnon-secure data communications through a GSM network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

FIG. 10 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishsecure data communications through a GSM network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 11 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishIP voice communications over an IP network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 12 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishIP data communications over an IP network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 13 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishWiFi voice communications over a WiFi network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 14 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishWiFi data communications over a WiFi network, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

FIG. 15 shows the reach-back communications terminal set up to establishsatellite voice communications over a satellite network, in accordancewith the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 16 shows a conventional configuration including a datainterconnection between an encryption device and a data port of asatellite phone.

FIG. 17 shows use of a modem to satellite interconnect board to providea data path between an encryption device and the data port of asatellite phone, including the ability to interpret control signals andcontrol the satellite system appropriately, in accordance with an aspectof the present invention.

FIG. 18 is a block diagram of an exemplary modem to satelliteinterconnect board shown in FIG. 17 in more detail.

FIG. 19 is a block diagram of another exemplary modem to satelliteinterconnect board providing both an otherwise conventional Fax/datainterconnect between an encryption device and a fax machine, as well asan interconnect between the encryption device and the data port of asatellite phone, in accordance with the principles of the presentinvention.

FIG. 20 shows the potential data rates for the different types ofcommunication networks available with use on the reach-backcommunication terminal, in accordance with the principles of the presentinvention.

FIG. 21 shows keys available on the personality faceplate keypad, inaccordance with the principles of the present invention.

FIG. 22 shows a conventional fragmented secure communications network.

FIG. 23 shows a conventional combination wired and wirelesscommunication network supporting secure communications.

FIG. 24 shows a conventional deployable secure communication systemutilizing a satellite communication network.

FIG. 25 shows a conventional CDMA to GSM secure call setup.

FIG. 26 shows a conventional FNBDT example call.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS

The communications terminal disclosed herein is an extremely portableand fully capable remote access communications terminal ideal forreach-back secure communications over any of many network options, andother uses. Extending the reach of a headquarters' voice, data and videonetwork services, a reach-back communications terminal as disclosedherein offers key benefits. For instance, high availability and reliableconnectivity are provided, as are total access to vital resources, andsecure extension to the home office. Moreover, a reach-backcommunications terminal as disclosed herein allows a user to select alowest cost network routing option from among multiple possible networkoptions.

The disclosed reach-back communications terminal is a remotecommunications terminal that enables highly available connections backto a headquarters network, delivering dependable access tomission-critical personnel and information. Integrated componentssimplify access to varied networks allowing deployed users to select andconnect quickly to a network that best supports their present mission.

The disclosed reach-back communications terminal provides immediate andsecure access. For example, first responders require secure,readily-available voice, data and video communications. The reach-backcommunications terminal disclosed herein enables fast and secureconnectivity to multiple telecommunications networks. Security isguaranteed with Type 4 encryption or optional NSA Type 1 encryption. Aspart of a system solution, reach-back communications terminal homestations provide end-to-end reach-back networking to infrastructure andservices. For US government users, the reach-back communicationsterminal enables remote connections to secure networks, e.g., to SIPRNETor NIPRNET.

Type 1 encryption may include L-3 OMNIxi, General Dynamics Sectera(Omega) and Sectera Wireline. Type 4 encryption includes GeneralDynamics TalkSecure (AES). The reach-back communications terminalpreferably also implements Type 1 Future NarrowBand Digital Terminal(FNBDT) signaling and cryptography specifications as defined by the U.S.Government. Non-Type 1 cryptography includes standard P224 EllipticCurve Cryptography (ECC) identified in FIPS 186-2.

The reach-back communications terminal implements Type 1 cryptography byimplementing Type 1 FNBDT signaling and cryptography specifications asdefined by the U.S. Government.

The reach-back communications terminal implements non-Type 1cryptography using standard P-224 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC),identified FIPS 186-2, to derive a pair-wise, unique session key. ECCprovides a higher security strength than RSA for a given key length andincreases as the key length grows. For example, a 160-bit ECC key isequivalently secure to a 1024-bit RSA key, a 224-bit ECC key is moresecure than a 2048-bit RSA key, and a 320-bit ECC key is equivalentlysecure to a 5120-bit RSA key.

During secure call setup, the reach-back communications terminalexchanges public keys with the remote terminal using FNBDT signaling.Traffic encryption is performed using the NIST approved AdvancedEncryption System (AES) standard (Rijndael) and a 128-bit random key(2^128 possible keys).

The disclosed reach-back communications terminal is housed in an easilyportable and lightweight casing, e.g., weighing less than 15 pounds inthe disclosed embodiments. Easy terminal set up takes three minutes orless, and users plug in their own, familiar laptop for direct systemaccess. For ease of portability, the reach-back communications terminal100 may be associated with a carrying case, e.g., computer-style andruggedized.

FIG. 1 is a depiction of a combination wired and wireless communicationnetwork supporting secure communications including a reach-backcommunications network 100, in accordance with the principles of thepresent invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 1, a combination wired and wirelesscommunication network comprises various analog and digital communicationnetworks 1900, such as PSTN 1901, analog communication network 1902 anddigital network 1903. Devices connecting to the various digitalcommunication networks 1900 include mobile satellite service devices1910 connecting to a satellite service 1911, e.g., Iridium, Globalstarand INMARSAT Mini-M. Further devices connecting to the various digitalcommunication networks 1900 include an encryptor 1920 (e.g., an FNBDTencryptor), digital cellular telephones 1930 using, e.g., GSMcommunication standards and digital cellular telephones 1940 connectingto a CDMA network.

In accordance with the principles of the present invention, thedisclosed reach-back communication terminals 100 are able to obtain asecure connection with any of the other communication devices of FIG. 1,including with each other, thus providing a flexible cross-networksecure communications channel between like or differing user devices.Exemplary network communication paths include a satellite service 1911,a GSM cellular network, and a CDMA cellular network.

FIG. 2A shows a front panel view of an exemplary reach-backcommunications terminal 100, in accordance with the principles of thepresent invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 2A, the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 is comprised of a network selector switch 110, statusindicator lights 120, an IP Config port 123, a PSTN port 125, anEthernet/WiFi Config port 130, a secure data OUT port to a satellitetransceiver port (SDOS) 150, a PBX handset port 162, a PBX Controlswitch 165, a PBX base port 174, an unsecured GSM/GPRS data port 180, apower button 192, and a DC power-in connector 194.

Two antenna, antenna 152 and antenna 154, although preferably connectedto the back of the reach-back communications terminal 100 are viewablefrom the front panel view of the reach-back communications terminal 100.Antenna 152 and antenna 154 allow transmission to and reception from acellular telephone network, e.g., a GSM network, and a wireless fidelity(WiFi) network, respectively.

The power button 192 is used to activate internal circuitry within thereach-back communications terminal 100. The AC/DC power supply 182,shown in FIG. 4, is connectable to an AC power source 184, e.g., aconventional wall outlet, in the exemplary embodiments. Power providedby the AC power source 184 (e.g., 110/220V, 50/60 Hz) is converted to12V DC by the AC/DC power supply 182 for connection to the DC power-inconnector 194.

Alternately, a DC power source (e.g., a 12V battery pack) can be used asa power source. The DC power source, not shown, is preferably externalto the housing of the reach-back communications terminal 100 tofacilitate streamlined autonomy from external power sources, though aninternal DC power source is within the principles of the invention.Preferably, universal power inputs/battery packs are utilized to allowfor un-tethered operations and ease of replacing components.

Network selector switch 110 allows a user of the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 the flexibility to choose one of a pluralityof data communications networks and voice communications networks. Datacommunications and voice can occur over any available network, e.g.,Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Private Branch Exchange (PBX),Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), satellite (SAT), InternetProtocol (IP) or WiFi.

The status indicator lights 120 allow an operator of the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 a visual verification of selection of thedesired data communications circuitry and voice communications circuitrywithin the reach-back communications terminal 100, and a visualindication of an available signal on the selected data communicationsnetwork and voice communications network.

IP Config port 123 is a non-secure connection point for a personalcomputer to connect to and configure the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 with a static IP address. For example, in instances where adynamic address is unobtainable from a network connection, a staticaddress will be assigned to the reach-back communications terminal 100by an application executed on a personal computer connected to the IPConfig port 123.

Ethernet/WiFi Config port 130 serves a dual purpose. Ethernet/WiFiConfig port 130 is a non-secure connection point for a personal computerto connect to the reach-back communications terminal 100 to configure aWiFi connection. Alternately, a menu option on the personality faceplate145 can be used to configure the reach-back communications terminal 100for connection to a WiFi network. Ethernet/WiFi Config port 130 is usedto connect the reach-back communications terminal 100 to a wired LAN.

The unsecured GSM/GPRS data port 180 allows users of the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 unencrypted access to a GSM/GPRS network ifdesired. Any device with the proper connector, such as a PDA or personalcomputer can be connected to the unsecured GSM/GPRS data port 180 toallow that device unsecured access to a GSM network and a GPRS network.

SDOS port 150 allows users of the reach-back communications terminal 100a secure connection to a compatible satellite device. Any devices with acompatible connector, such as a satellite telephone and an Inmarsat M4terminal, can be connected to the SDOS port 150 to allow the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 access to a satellite network.

PSTN port 125 allow the reach-back communications terminal 100 to beconnected to a PSTN network.

PBX handset port 162 and PBX base port 174 allow respectively a handsetfrom a conventional telephone and a handset port from a conventionaltelephone to be connected to the reach-back communications terminal, asshown in FIG. 6.

The PBX control switch 165 is used to switch internal circuitry withinthe reach-back communications terminal 100 between different modescorresponding to different types of PBX systems. The inventors havedetermined that there are essentially four predominant, different PBXtypes commonly found currently in use. Of course, other types of PBXsystems may be implemented, perhaps requiring a switch 165 havingadditional positions, within the scope of the present invention.

For example, after a user connects the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 to a PBX wall plate 320, shown in FIG. 6, the integratedtelephone handset 176, shown in FIG. 2B, may be picked up to listen fora dial tone. If no dial tone is audible, the PBX control switch 165 maybe moved to another designated position until an audible dial tone isavailable. An audible dial tone indicates that the PBX control switch165 is at a position of compatibility for a particular PBX network thatthe reach-back communications terminal 100 is currently connected to.

Likewise, network selector switch 110 is rotatable through six positionsPSTN, PBX, GSM, SAT, IP and WIFI. The six positions, i.e., PSTN, PBX,GSM, SAT, IP and WIFI, correspond respectively to: PSTN communicationsusing PSTN port 125; PBX communications using PBX base port 174; GSMcommunications using GSM antenna 152; SAT communications using SDOS 150;IP communications using Ethernet port 130; and WiFi communications usingWiFi antenna 154.

For example, as shown in FIG. 2A, network selector switch 110 may berotated with an indicator pointing to PSTN communications to selectcommunications over a public switched telephone network (PSTN). With thenetwork selector switch 110 pointing to PSTN communications, thereach-back communications terminal 100 is configured to access a PSTNthrough PSTN port 125.

FIG. 2B shows a top panel view of the reach-back communications terminal100, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 2B, the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 further comprises a personality faceplate keypad 146, apersonality faceplate 145, a personality faceplate display 147, anintegrated telephone handset 176 and an integrated telephone handsetkeypad 175,

The integrated telephone handset 176 and integrated telephone keypad 175are used as conventional telephone handsets and telephone keypads inconducting telephone conversations and dialing a destination telephonenumber. Calls using the integrated telephone handset 176 are capable ofNSA Type 1 or Type 4, AES encryption using the encryption circuitrywithin the personality faceplate 145.

The personality faceplate 145 contains the necessary encryptioncircuitry for the reach-back communications terminal 100, fitting into amounting area cut for the particular encryption device used (i.e., anFNBDT encryptor). The personality faceplate 145 includes a personalityfaceplate keypad 146 for data entry and a personality faceplate display147 for allowing a user to visually interface with menu optionsavailable on the personality faceplate 145.

The personality faceplate 145 is removably connected to the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 for convenient replacement with an alternateencryption FNBDT encryptor. Moreover, in the event that the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is used in a situation where a user mustprotect the personality faceplate 145 from being confiscated, thepersonality faceplate 145 is easily removable for destruction and/orportability.

FIG. 2C shows a top/rear view of the reach-back communications terminal100, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 2C, the reach-back communicationsterminal further comprises a port for connecting secure data from a PC(SDIPC) 140. The SDIPC port 140 is conveniently located on the back ofthe reach-back communications terminal for interconnectivity with, e.g.,a desktop computer, a laptop computer, handheld computers, digitalcameras, etc. Preferably, the SDIPC port 140 is an RS-232 serial port.Although an RS-232 serial port is preferable, one of ordinary skill inthe art would recognize that the reach-back communications terminal 100can utilize any of a plurality of computer interfaces without departingfrom the scope of the invention, e.g., a USB-port.

FIG. 2D(1) shows a rear cut-away view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 2D(1), the reach-back communicationsterminal further comprises a GSM personality card 800 that is accessiblethrough GSM personality card access panel 810 on the bottom of thereach-back communications terminal.

The GSM personality card 800 allows the reach-back communicationsterminal to be uniquely identified by a GSM network, the same as aconventional GSM telephone contains a personality card 809 to uniquelyidentify it to a GSM network.

In the event that the GSM personality card 800 needs to be accessed, theGSM personality card is extracted from the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 and replaced. GSM personality card access panel 810 isrecessed on the bottom of the terminal to protect the GSM personalitycard 800.

In the disclosed embodiment, the GSM personality card 800 is asubscriber identity module (SIM) card, or smart card, installed as partof a GSM cellular phone that encrypts voice and data transmissions andstores data about the specific user so that the user can be identifiedand authenticated to the relevant GSM network supplying the phoneservice. The GSM personality (SIM) card 800 also stores data such aspersonal phone settings specific to the user and phone numbers. A SIMcan be moved from one phone to another and/or different SIMs can beinserted into any GSM phone. For example, if a user has one reach-backcommunications terminal at home, and another at the office, they cancarry the GSM personality (SIM) card 800 with them between reach-backcommunications terminals. Alternatively, multiple GSM personality (SIM)cards 800 may be maintained by the user, and depending upon the contextof the secure call (e.g., personal, business, specific contract ormission, etc.), they can swap between their various GSM personality(SIM) cards 800. Of course, multiple users of the reach-backcommunications terminal can each carry their own GSM personality (SIM)card 800, and install it into the reach-back communications terminalwhen they desire to use it.

In the disclosed embodiments, despite being a secure, reach-backcommunications terminal with encryption capability, the GSM personality(SIM) card 800 is preferably nevertheless mounted for easy externalaccess by the user, as shown in FIG. 2D(1). As shown in FIG. 2D(1), aGSM SIM card reader 809 is preferably mounted near a surface of a caseenclosing the reach-back communications terminal (e.g., near the bottomsurface), with an access opening in the bottom surface allowing a userto easily swap between GSM personality (SIM) cards 800.

FIG. 2D(2) shows a base cut-away view of the reach-back communicationsterminal, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 2D(2), the GSM personality card 800 isalternately viewed from the bottom of the reach-back communicationsterminal.

While the particular ports, personality cards and switches are shown invarious locations and with various names, it will be understood by thoseof skill in the art that other locations on the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 may be suitable for any particular portand/or switch, while remaining within the scope of the presentinvention.

Although a GSM type personality card is discussed herein, it ispreferable that any of various types of personality cards can be usedwith the reach-back communications terminal 100. For example, variouspersonality cards that might be used include T-Mobile, Cingular.Moreover, the reach back communications terminal 100 may be adapted toaccommodate a plurality of personality cards to allow for connection toa plurality of cellular networks. For example, OCONUS the user may wantto use a personality card suitable for the geographic area, such as foran 1800 MHz network.

FIG. 3 shows an exemplary configuration for a reach-back communicationsterminal configured for access to a WAN, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 3, the disclosed, exemplary reach-backcommunications terminal 100 further comprises accommodation forconnection to a digital PBX via a digital PBX adapter 380, a GSM fixedcellular terminal 382, an Iridium modem via an Iridium modem adapter384, an analog to IP voice channel via an analog to IP voice adapter386, and a WiFi bridge 388.

As discussed in relation to FIG. 2A, by rotating the network selectorswitch 110 to one of a desired WAN, e.g., PSTN, PBX, GSM, SAT, IP andWIFI, respective components within the reach-back communication terminalare activated and internal signals are directed to communicate with thedesired network. As the network selector switch 110 is rotated throughpositions PSTN, PBX, GSM, SAT, IP and WIFI, respective adapters digitalPBX adapter 380, GSM fixed cellular terminal 382, Iridium modem adapter384, analog to IP voice adapter 386, and a WiFi bridge 388 are activatedallowing the reach-back communications terminal 100 to communicate withthe chosen network.

Depending on the position of the network selector switch 110, PBXtelephone deskset 300, personal computer 220 and a satellite handset390, e.g., an Iridium handset, are selectively configured by thereach-back communications terminal 100 for communicating with arespective network.

PSTN Communications

FIG. 4 shows the disclosed embodiment of a reach-back communicationsterminal 100 set up to establish voice communications through a PSTNnetwork, in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 4, a PSTN network is accessed directlyfrom the front panel of the reach-back communications terminal 100through a PSTN wall line jack 200. The integrated telephone handset 176is used to make unencrypted voice calls, similarly as with aconventional telephone. The integrated telephone handset keypad 175 isused to dial a target telephone number.

To establish an unencrypted voice call over a PSTN connection, networkselector switch 110 is set to the PSTN position. The reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is connected to the PSTN wall line jack 200by connecting a conventional PSTN cable 210 to PSTN port 125. Theintegrated telephone handset keypad 175 is used to dial a destinationtelephone number. For unencrypted voice calls, the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 provides not further capability than aconventional PSTN telephone.

To establish an encrypted voice call over a PSTN connection, the networkselector switch 110 is set to the PSTN position. The reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is connected to the PSTN wall line jack 200by connecting a conventional PSTN cable 210, e.g., an RJ-11 cable, toPSTN port 125. The integrated telephone handset keypad 175 is used todial a destination telephone number.

To designate a PSTN voice call as being encrypted, a user of thereach-back communications terminal 100 dials a prefix before dialing adestination telephone number. For example, for a secure encryptedtelephone call, a user is required to dial “*02*” before dialing thedestination telephone number 202-555-1212. Therefore, a user of thereach-back communications terminal 100 dials 02-202-555-1212 toestablish a secure encrypted PSTN voice call. If the remote end of thecall is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”, the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 will automatically establish a secure callwith the remote end of the call. Alternately, after an unencrypted PSTNvoice call is established, one of the calling parties must press“SECURE” on the personality faceplate keypad 146 to change theunencrypted PSTN voice call to an encrypted PSTN voice call.

FIG. 5 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish data communications through a PSTN network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 5, to establish an unencrypted data callover a PSTN connection, the network selector switch 110 is set to thePSTN position. A serial cable or USB cable 230 is used to connect apersonal computer 220 to the SDIPC 140 of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100. The personal computer 220 must be set to recognize anexternal modem within the reach-back communications terminal 100. Thepersonal computer 220 is used to dial into a remote site.

To establish an encrypted data call over a PSTN connection, the networkselector switch 110 is set to the PSTN position. A serial cable or USBcable 230 is used to connect a personal computer 220 to the SDIPC 140 ofthe reach-back communications terminal 100. The personal computer 220must be set to recognize an external modem within the reach-backcommunications terminal 100. A data application on the personal computer220 is used to dial into a remote site.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure PSTN data call between the personal computer 220 and a remotecomputer. Alternately, a user can toggle a “Secure Select” option on aconfiguration menu on the reach-back communications terminal 100.Instructions are then given to the user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 for placing an encrypted PSTN data call.

PBX Communications

FIG. 6 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish voice communications through a PBX network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 6, a PBX is accessed by the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 through a PBX telephone deskset 300connected to a PBX wall plate 320. A PBX handset cord 340, e.g., anRJ-13, conventionally connected to a PBX handset 310 is disconnected andplugging into the PBX handset port 162 on the reach-back communicationsterminal 100. A PBX deskset handset jack that is conventionallyconnected to the PBX handset 310 is instead connected to the PBX baseport 174 using an appropriate cable, e.g., an RJ-13 telephone cord. ThePBX telephone keypad 350 on the PBX telephone deskset 300 is used toperform dialing functions for calls using a PBX network.

FIG. 6A depicts a digital PBX adapter connected with a PBX base unit,the handset of the PBX base unit, and a PSTN common bus/circuit switchconnected in turn to an encryption unit, in accordance with theprinciples of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 6A, the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 includes a digital PBX adapter 380 comprised largely of anaudio switch 677. The audio switch 677 has an adjustable output gain,controlled by the 4-position switch 165. The adjustable gain is formedusing, e.g., a well known resistor ladder circuit. While the adjustablegain control switch 165 in the exemplary embodiment has 4 positions, ingraduated gain increments, more (or even fewer) gain selections withinthe audio switch 677 are also contemplated within the principles of thepresent invention.

The correct position of the adjustable gain switch 165 is empiricallydetermined. The user will hear a reverb effect in the headset based onthe volume capability of the PBX system. The FNBDT encryptor of thereach-back communications terminal 100 won't be able to establish modemcommunications with another FNBDT or STE encryptor if the PBX adjustablegain control switch is not properly set.

In the given embodiment, the gain control switch 165 is initially set ina common position (e.g., position 3). If the FNBDT encryptor is able toestablish communications, then the setting is proper. If not, then theuser manually switches the position of the gain control switch 165 to,e.g., position 2, and tries again to establish secure communicationsagain. Again, if the communications are established, then position 2 isproper for the particular PBX being used. If not, then the user maymanually move the gain control switch to, e.g., position 1 and tryagain. Position 4 may be tried after position 1.

The particular order of positions of the gain control switch 165 are forexemplary purposes only.

The LINE phone jack 174 of the digital PBX adapter 380 is wired to thevacated handset jack on the phone base unit using, e.g., a standardcoiled handset cord. The handset that was disconnected from the baseunit is then rewired into the HANDSET phone jack 162 of the digital PBXadapter 380 using, e.g., a standard coiled handset cord.

The output of the audio switch 677 is connected internal to thereach-back communications terminal 100 to a PSTN common bus of aswitching circuit 678, which in the PBX mode switches a 2-wireconnection from the digital PBX adapter 380 to the PSTN IN input of theencryption device 145 (i.e., FNBDT encryptor). Other inputs to the PSTNcommon bus of the switch circuit 678 (e.g., GSM modem, etc.) are notshown in FIG. 6A for simplicity.

When the handset of the PBX is in an OFF hook condition, in an unsecuremode, then optical relays close to cause a bypass in the audio switch677. Thus, in the OFF hook condition, the PBX handset can be used tocommunicate with its handset base in an otherwise conventional fashion.Encrypted communications may take place through the FNBDT encryptor.

To make an unsecured PBX voice call, the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 does not provide any further capability beyond using thePBX telephone deskset 300. The integrated telephone handset 176 is usedto dial a destination telephone number and converse with a called party.

To make a secured PBX voice call, the network selector switch 110 is setto the PBX position. The PBX handset 310 is taken off-hook. The PBXtelephone keypad 350 is used to dial a destination telephone number.Once a call is established with a destination telephone number, theintegrated telephone handset 176 is used to converse with the calledparty

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure PBX call with the remote end of the call. Alternately, after anunencrypted call is established, one of the calling parties must press“SECURE” on the personality faceplate keypad 146 to change anunencrypted PBX call to a secure encrypted mode.

FIG. 7 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish data communications through a PBX network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 7, to make an unsecured PBX data call,the network selector switch 110 is set to the PBX position. A menuoption on the personality faceplate 145 is chosen to allow unencrypteddata communications. A PBX network is accessed by the personal computer220 through the reach-back communications terminal 100 through the PBXtelephone deskset 300 connected to a PBX wall plate 320. The PBX handsetcord 340 connected to a PBX handset 310 is disconnected and plugginginto the PBX handset port 162 on the reach-back communications terminal100. A PBX deskset handset jack that is conventionally connected to thePBX handset 310 is instead connected to the PBX base port 174 using anappropriate cable, e.g., an RJ-13 telephone cord. Personal computer 220is connected to the SDIPC 140 using a serial cable or USB cable 230.

Both the integrated telephone handset 176 and the PBX handset 310 areleft off-hook. The personal computer 220 must be set to recognize anexternal modem within the reach-back communications terminal 100. ThePBX telephone keypad 350 is used to dial a destination telephone number.After dialing the destination telephone number on the PBX telephonekeypad 350, a data application on the personal computer 220 is initiatedto make a data link call.

To make an encrypted PBX data call, the network selector switch 110 isset to the PBX position. The PBX handset 310 is disconnected from thePBX telephone unit's handset jack and connected to the reach-backcommunications terminal's 100 PBX handset port 162. The PBX telephoneunit's 300 handset jack is connected to the reach-back communicationsterminal's 100 PBX base port 174 using an appropriate cable, e.g., anRJ-13 telephone cord. The personal computer 220 is connected to theSDIPC 140 using cable 230. Both the integrated telephone handset 176 andthe PBX telephone handset 310 are left off-hook.

The personal computer 220 must be set to recognize an external modemwithin the reach-back communications terminal 100. The PBX telephonekeypad 350 is used to dial a destination telephone number. After dialingthe destination telephone number on the PBX keypad 350, a dataapplication on the personal computer 220 is initiated to make a datalink call.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure PBX data call between the personal computer 220 and a remotecomputer. Alternately, a user can toggle a “Secure Select” option on aconfiguration menu on the reach-back communications terminal 100.Instructions are then given to the user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 for placing an encrypted PBX data call.

GSM Communications

FIG. 8 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish voice communications through a GSM network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 8, the GSM antenna 152 allows cellularcommunications to be established using any of four cellular frequencies.In particular, the GSM antenna 152 allows communications at frequenciesof 850 MHz at 2.2 dBi, 900 MHz at 2.2 dBi, 1800 MHz at 3 dBi and 1900MHz at 3 dBi over approved circuit-switched digital networks.

To initiate a secure call over a circuit switched data network and not aGPRS network, a number designation proceeds the entry of a telephonenumber, e.g., “*02*”. To receive a secure message, the call initiatormust use a designated number assigned to the reach-back communicationsterminal 100. The reach-back communications terminal 100 convenientlyhas a separate non-secure GSM/GPRS data port 180 to allow usersunencrypted access to a GPRS network if desired.

To establish an unencrypted voice call using a GSM network, the networkselector switch 110 is set to the GSM position. The GSM antenna 152 isset up to optimize communications with a GSM network. The statusindicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 is receiving a GSM signal. To allow a user of thereach-back communications terminal 100 to determine the strength of thesignal, an LED indicator on the status indicator lights 120 will flashsequentially from one to four times to indicate the strength of the GSMsignal. Alternately, a solid non-flashing LED indicator on the statusindicator lights 120 will indicate a strong signal.

The integrated telephone handset 176 and the integrated telephonehandset keypad 175 are used to dial and conduct conversations during anunencrypted voice call established over a GSM network.

To establish an encrypted GSM voice call, the network selector switch110 is set to the GSM position. The GSM antenna 152 is set up tooptimize communications with a GSM network. The status indicator lights120 will indicate that the reach-back communications terminal 100 isreceiving a GSM signal. To allow a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 to determine the strength of the signal, an LED indicatoron the status indicator lights 120 will flash sequentially from one tofour times to indicate the strength of the GSM signal. Alternately, asolid non-flashing LED indicator on the status indicator lights 120 willindicate a strong signal.

The integrated telephone handset 176 and the integrated telephonehandset keypad 175 are used to dial and conduct conversations during anencrypted telephone call established over a GSM network. To designate atelephone call as being encrypted, a user of the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 dials a prefix before dialing a destinationtelephone number. For example, for a secure encrypted telephone call, auser is required to dial “*02*” before dialing the destination telephonenumber 202-555-1212. Therefore a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 dials *02*-202-555-1212 to establish a secure encryptedtelephone call. If the remote end of the call is configured for “AutoSecure on Answer”, the reach-back communications terminal 100 willautomatically establish a secure call with the remote end of the call.

FIG. 9 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish non-secure data communications through a GSM network, inaccordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 9, to establish an unencrypted GSM datacall, the network selector switch 110 is set to the GSM position. TheGSM antenna 152 is set up to optimize communications with a GSM network.The status indicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is receiving a GSM signal. To allow a userof the reach-back communications terminal 100 to determine the strengthof the signal, an LED indicator on the status indicator lights 120 willflash sequentially from one to four times to indicate the strength ofthe GSM signal. Alternately, a solid non-flashing LED indicator on thestatus indicator lights 120 will indicate a strong signal.

Personal computer 220 is connected to the SDIPC 140 by a serial cable ora USB cable 230. A data application on the personal computer 220 dialsinto a remote site, with a remote site answering the call with acorresponding data application.

FIG. 10 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish secure data communications through a GSM network, inaccordance with the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 10, to establish an encrypted GSM datacall, the network selector 110 is set to the GSM position. A serialcable or USB cable 230 is used to connect the personal computer 220 tothe SDIPC 140. The GSM antenna 152 is set up to optimize communicationswith a GSM network. The status indicator lights 120 will indicate thatthe reach-back communications terminal 100 is receiving a GSM signal. Toallow a user of the reach-back communications terminal 100 to determinethe strength of the signal, an LED indicator on the status indicatorlights 120 will flash sequentially from 1 to 4 times to indicate thestrength of the GSM signal. Alternately, a solid non-flashing LEDindicator on the status indicator lights 120 will indicate a strongsignal.

A data application on the personal computer 220 is used to dial a remotesite. The data application dials a prefix to designate a telephone callas being encrypted. For example, for a secure encrypted telephone call,the data application is required to dial “*02*” before dialing thedestination telephone number 202-555-1212. Therefore the dataapplication dials *02*-202-555-1212 to establish a secure encryptedtelephone call. If the remote end of the call is configured for “AutoSecure on Answer”, the reach-back communications terminal 100 willautomatically establish a secure call with the remote end of the call.Alternately, when an encrypted call is received, the receiving partymust press “SECURE” on the personality faceplate keypad 146 to receivean encrypted GSM call.

IP Communications

FIG. 11 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish IP voice communications over an IP network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 11, ethernet port 130 allows thereach-back communications terminal 100 to connect over any IP network,preferably supporting Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)addressing. Alternately, the reach-back communications terminal 100 canutilize a static IP address. To obtain a dynamically assigned IP addressonce connected to an IP network, the reach-back communications terminal100 requests an IP address from the network. Alternately, a static IPaddress can be assigned to the reach-back communications terminal 100for connection to an IP network.

To establish an IP unencrypted voice call using an IP connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the IP position. Ethernet port 130is connected to a conventional local area network (LAN) wall plate 600using an appropriate cable, e.g., CAT 5, CAT 6, etc. The integratedtelephone handset keypad 175 is used to dial a destination telephonenumber.

To establish an IP encrypted voice call using an IP connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the IP position. Ethernet port 130is connected to a LAN wall plate 600 using an appropriate cable, e.g.,CAT 5, CAT 6, etc. The integrated telephone handset keypad 175 is usedto dial a destination telephone number.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure call with the remote end of the call.

FIG. 12 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish IP data communications over an IP network, in accordance withthe principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 12, to establish an IP unencrypted datacall using an IP connection, the network selector switch 110 is set tothe IP position. The Ethernet port 130 is connected to a LAN wall plate400 using an appropriate cable, e.g., CAT 5, CAT 6, etc. A serial cableor USB cable 230 is used to connect the personal computer 220 to theSDIPC 140 of the reach-back communications terminal 100. The personalcomputer 220 must be set to recognize an external modem within thereach-back communications terminal 100.

A menu option on the personality faceplate 145 is chosen to enable anunsecured data call. A data application on the personal computer 220 isused to dial a destination telephone number.

To establish an IP encrypted data call using an IP connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the IP position. The Ethernet port130 on the reach-back communications terminal 100 is connected to a LANwall plate 400 using an appropriate cable. The integrated telephonehandset's 176 integrated telephone handset keypad 175 is used to dial adestination telephone number.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure call with the remote end of the call.

WiFi Communications

FIG. 13 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish WiFi voice communications over a WiFi network, in accordancewith the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 13, the WiFi antenna 154 connects toWiFi circuitry within reach-back communications terminal 100 that allowsWiFi communications using a WiFi frequency, e.g. 2400 MHz at 3 dBi. AWiFi interface allows the reach-back communications terminal 100 toestablish a secure connection over any IP network, preferably supportingDHCP addressing. Alternately, a static IP address can be assigned to thereach-back communications terminal 100 for connection to an IP network.

To obtain a dynamically assigned IP address once connected to a WiFinetwork, a WiFi bridge within the reach-back communications terminal 100requests an IP address from a WiFi network. Secure communications areconducted over the WiFi network using Vonage voice-over-IP (VoIP)service for both voice and data.

To establish a WiFi unencrypted voice call using a WiFi connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the WiFi position. The WiFiantenna 154 is set up to optimize communications with a WiFi network.The status indicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is receiving a WiFi signal. The reach-backcommunications terminal 100 will automatically pick up an IP addressfrom the WiFi network, possibly taking several minutes. Once a dial toneis available on the integrated telephone handset 176, a destinationtelephone number is dialed using the integrated telephone handset keypad175 to established a call over a WiFi network.

To establish a WiFi encrypted voice call using a WiFi connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the WiFi position. The WiFiantenna 154 is set up to optimize communications with a WiFi network.The status indicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is receiving a WiFi signal. The reach-backcommunications terminal 100 will automatically pick up an IP addressfrom the WiFi network, possibly taking several minutes.

The integrated telephone handset keypad 175 and the integrated telephonehandset 176 are used to dial and conduct conversations during anencrypted voice call established over a WiFi network.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure call with the remote end of the call.

FIG. 14 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish WiFi data communications over a WiFi network, in accordancewith the principles of the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 14, to establish a WiFi unencrypted datacall using a WiFi connection, the network selector switch 110 is set tothe WiFi position. A menu option on the personality faceplate 145 ischosen to allow unencrypted data communications. The WiFi antenna 154 isset up to optimize communications with a WiFi network. The statusindicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 is receiving a WiFi signal. The reach-back communicationsterminal 100 will automatically pick up an IP address from the WiFinetwork, possibly taking several minutes. A serial cable or USB cable230 is used to connect the personal computer 220 to the SDIPC port 140.

To establish a WiFi encrypted data call using a WiFi connection, thenetwork selector switch 110 is set to the WiFi position. The WiFiantenna 154 is set up to optimize communications with a WiFi network.The status indicator lights 120 will indicate that the reach-backcommunications terminal 100 is receiving a WiFi signal. The reach-backcommunications terminal 100 will automatically pick up an IP addressfrom the WiFi network, possibly taking several minutes. A serial cableor USB cable 230 is used to connect the personal computer 220 to theSDIPC 140.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure call with the remote end of the call.

SAT Communications

FIG. 15 shows the reach-back communications terminal 100 set up toestablish satellite voice communications over a satellite network, inaccordance with the principles of the present invention.

A satellite communications link allows a secure connection for bothvoice and data. The reach-back communications terminal 100 can interfacewith any satellite interface that accepts AT command input, e.g.,Iridium, Inmarsat Mini-M, Globalstar, etc. The reach-back communicationsterminal 100 eliminates the need to dial into a red switch for Iridium,as is necessary with the GD Iridium Secure Module (ISM). Although asatellite telephone 390 is shown in FIG. 3, any data transceiver, e.g.,a cellular telephone, is connectable to the SATCOM port 150 that iscompatible with the particular connection used, e.g., a serialconnection.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 15, to make an unsecured SAT voice call,the reach-back communications terminal 100 does not provide any furthercapability beyond using the satellite handset 390.

To establish a secured satellite voice call using a satelliteconnection, the network selector switch 110 is set to the SAT position.Satellite transceiver 914 is connected to the SATCOM port 150 using anappropriate cable 915, e.g., a serial cable. A keypad on the satellitetransceiver is used to dial a destination telephone number.

Once a connection is established with a destination telephone number,the integrated telephone handset 176 is used to conduct conversationsover the satellite network. If the remote end of the call is configuredfor “Auto Secure on Answer”, the reach-back communications terminal 100will automatically establish a secure call with the remote end of thecall.

To make an unsecured satellite data call, the network selector switch110 is set to the SAT position. The satellite network is accessed by thepersonal computer 220 through the reach-back communications terminal 100through the satellite telephone 390. Personal computer 220 is connectedto the SDIPC 140 using a serial cable or USB cable 230. The personalcomputer 220 must be set to recognize an external modem within thereach-back communications terminal 100.

A menu option on the personality faceplate 145 is chosen to enable anunsecured data call. The satellite telephone keypad 520 is used to diala destination telephone number. After dialing the destination telephonenumber on a satellite transceiver keypad, the personal computer 220 isinitiated to make a data link call.

To make an encrypted satellite data call, the network selector switch110 is set to the SAT position. The personal computer 220 is connectedto the SDIPC 140. The personal computer 220 must be set to recognize anexternal modem within the reach-back communications terminal 100. Asatellite transceiver keypad is used to dial a destination telephonenumber. After dialing the destination telephone number on the satellitetransceiver keypad, a data application on the personal computer 220 isinitiated to make a data link call.

If the remote end of the call is configured for “Auto Secure on Answer”,the reach-back communications terminal 100 will automatically establisha secure satellite data call between the personal computer 220 and aremote computer.

FIG. 16 shows a conventional configuration including a datainterconnection between an encryption device and a data port of asatellite phone.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 16, a data connection is shown betweenan encryption device 145 and a data port 402 of a satellite phone 1911as conventional devices and techniques would allow.

Exemplary satellite systems include IRIDIUM, GLOBAL STAR, INMARSAT(mini-m narrowband 9,600 baud network) and THURAYA (a middle easternnetwork). However, as realized by the present inventors, each of thesesatellite systems blindly expect modem type data to be input through itsdata port. Control of the satellite system, using AT commands (i.e.,RS-232 type modem commands) happen outside the data line. For ordinarydata being passed over the line, this is not a problem. However, withencrypted information, all information is contained within the modemdata signal, with no accommodation for signaling outside of the modemdata signal. Thus, with respect to encrypted data on the secure side ofan encryption device, the satellite system does not receive controlsignals with respect to that data stream. Thus, commands such as dialinga telephone number cannot be accomplished with DTMF tones digitized andcontained within the data stream. So, control signals such as start/stopbits will not work in a conventional configuration such as is shown inFIG. 16. Thus, the configuration of FIG. 16 will pass encrypted dataover a satellite phone, but, if fully conforming to encryptionstandards, will not allow control functions to be passed from a secureside of the reach-back communications terminal to the non-secure sideincluding the satellite system.

Moreover, the configuration of FIG. 16 will not allow conventionalencrypted communications to transmit encrypted data through ordinarysatellite channels because of the use of voice compression (e.g., CELP,RELP, etc.) and extremely slow data speeds (e.g., 2400 bits per second(b/s)) within the satellite system itself. Thus, conventional reach-backcommunication systems are not able to transmit secure data over asatellite system such as IRIDIUM, which use data compression techniques(e.g., CELP, RELP, etc.) at a relatively slow data rate (e.g., 2400b/s). Typical satellite network data rates are too slow to accommodate astream of encrypted data.

FIG. 17 shows use of a modem to satellite interconnect board to providea data path between an encryption device and the data port of asatellite phone, including the ability to interpret control signals andcontrol the satellite system appropriately, in accordance with an aspectof the present invention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 17, a modem to satellite interconnectboard 400 is interjected in the path between the conventional encryptiondevice 145 and the conventional satellite phone 1911.

The modem to satellite interconnect board 400 transmits serial data or adigital fax from an analog device, in particular the encryption device145, to a satellite phone 1911, thereby eliminating the extra steps andtechnology normally needed to make these devices “talk to” to eachother. By sending information directly to a device, the modem tosatellite interconnect board 400 simplifies design issues by providingan interface for new protocols and enabling compatibility betweenexisting technologies. While disclosed with respect to interconnectionbetween the encryption device 145 and a satellite device, the modem tosatellite interconnect board 400 may alternatively be adapted to includeprotocols and interfaces to work with any circuit data enabled wirelessphone, including CDMA, PCS, TDMA, GSM/GPRS and IDEN.

In accordance with this aspect of the invention, the modem to satelliteinterconnect board 400 monitors the data stream coming from theencryption device 145 to the modem to satellite interconnect board 400for the presence of dual-tone, multi-frequency (DTMF) tones representingcontrol signals, converts the DTMF tones to ASCII characters, which arein turn received as control signals by the satellite phone 1911,allowing control of the functions of the satellite system directly fromthe secure side of the encryption device 145.

An exemplary DTMF tone stream captured by the modem to satelliteinterconnect board 400 is the dialing of a telephone number from withinthe encrypted data path (i.e., in band signaling).

For example, the modem to satellite interconnect board 400 preferablyprovides a false dial tone to the encryption device 145. Breaking thedial tone, the user of the reach-back communications terminal 100including the encryption device 145 may dial a phone number, e.g., “800555 1212”. The modem to satellite interconnect board 400 breakspresentation of the dial tone upon detection of DTMF tones, and decodesthe entered phone number. The decoded phone number is then presented asstraight ASCII serial data, preferably out-of-band to the satellitephone 1911 to the control lines of the data port 402, e.g., as“ATD8005551212” (“attention, dial command, 800-555-1212”).

Thus, the modem to satellite interconnect board 400 performs thefollowing functions:

(1) captures DTMF tones;

(2) demodulates V.34 encrypted modem information; and

(3) converts both the captured DTMF tones and demodulated V.34 encryptedmodem information into an ASCII string for presentation to the data port402 of a satellite phone.

In this way, the modem to satellite interface board 400 can be seen asincluding a cloaking feature. In particular, the conversion of V.34modem data into an ASCII data stream can be seen as an encapsulation ofthe encrypted data, which cloaks the encrypted data such that it willappear to be benign data.

FIG. 18 is a block diagram of an exemplary modem to satelliteinterconnect board shown in FIG. 17 in more detail.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 18, the modem to satellite interconnectboard 400 includes a V.34 modem 410 and a DTMF conversion to ASCIImodule.

While shown with a V.34 modem 410, the modem to satellite interconnectboard 400 may alternatively, or additionally, include a modem followingother protocols. However, such protocol should accommodate the datasignal received from the encryption device 145.

The DTMF conversion to ASCII module 412 is preferably formed in aprogrammable integrated circuit (PIC), but may be implemented insoftware operating on a processor.

FIG. 19 is a block diagram of another exemplary modem to satelliteinterconnect board 400 a providing both an otherwise conventionalFax/data interconnect between an encryption device and a fax machine, aswell as an interconnect between the encryption device and the data portof a satellite phone, in accordance with the principles of the presentinvention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 19, the modem to satellite interconnectboard 400 of FIGS. 17 and 18 may include alternative output routes suchas an otherwise conventional data path between the V.34 modem 410 to aFax/data interface that translates fax data from the V.34 modem 410 to afax machine, as is known (e.g., a TelEnable™ board commerciallyavailable from Molex Inc.)

FIG. 20 shows exemplary data rates for the different types ofcommunication networks available with use on the disclosed reach-backcommunication terminal 100, in accordance with the principles of thepresent invention. The maximum data rate on any given communicationnetwork is dependent on the type of encryption used, as shown.

FIG. 21 shows exemplary display buttons available on the personalityfaceplate keypad 146, in accordance with the principles of the presentinvention.

In particular, as shown in FIG. 21, exemplary keys available to a userduring use of the reach-back communications terminal 100 are, a Scrollkey 510, a PIN Menu key 520, a Zeroize Menu key 530, a Key Mgmt Menu key540, a Service Menu key 550, a Config Menu key 560 and a Security Menukey 570.

The Scroll key 510 allows a user to scroll through menu options viewableon the encryption device display 147.

The PIN Menu key 520 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 to lock the terminal until a proper PIN has been entered onthe personality faceplate keypad 146. Moreover, the PIN Menu key 520allows a user of the reach-back communications terminal to enter a menuto change the existing stored PIN. PIN menu is displayed only when anauthorized user exists within the reach-back communications terminal100, and the reach-back communications terminal 100 is Off-Hook and notin a secure call.

The Zeroize Menu key 530 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal to zeroize a keyset, i.e., zeroize all keys and zeroize APK.Moreover, the Zeroize key 530 allows deletion of an authorized user ofthe reach-back communications terminal 100. Menus associated with theZeroize Menu key 530 may be restricted to the Master User of thereach-back communications terminal 100.

The Key Mgmt Menu key 540 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal to enter a menu to view keys and generate an APK.

The Security Menu key 570 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal to enter menus for adding a user, deleting a user,automatically locking the reach-back communication terminal 100, cleardata, automatically secure communications established with thereach-back communications terminal 100, automatically answer datacommunications and automatically answer a ring to the reach-backcommunications terminal 100. The options of deleting a user andautomatically locking the reach-back communications terminal are onlyavailable to authorized users.

The Config Menu key 560 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 to view a key status, clear data, set FNBDT timeouts, setbypasses, set a data port rate and set a modem data rate.

The Service Menu key 550 allows a user of the reach-back communicationsterminal 100 to verify software versions and determine the serial numberof the encryption device 145.

While the invention has been described with reference to the exemplaryembodiments thereof, those skilled in the art will be able to makevarious modifications to the described embodiments of the inventionwithout departing from the true spirit and scope of the invention.

1. A secure communications terminal, comprising: a satellite phonecomprising a data port; an encryption device; and a modem to satellitephone interconnect board to capture a Dial Tone Modulation Frequency(DTMF) tone, demodulate V.34 encrypted modem information received fromsaid encryption device, and convert said DTMF tone and said demodulateV.34 encrypted modem information into an ASCII string, said ASCII stringbeing presented out-of-band with respect to said DTMF tone to saidsatellite phone data port.
 2. The secure communications terminalaccording to claim 1, wherein: said modem to satellite phoneinterconnect board is comprised of a modem.
 3. The secure communicationsterminal according to claim 1, wherein: said modem to satellite phoneinterconnect board is formed in a programmable integrated circuit (PIC).4. The secure communications terminal according to claim 1, wherein:said modem to satellite phone interconnect board alternately received anoutput from a FAX/data interface.
 5. The secure communications terminalaccording to claim 1, wherein: said satellite phone is controlled from asecure side of said encryption device.
 6. The secure communicationsterminal according to claim 1, wherein: said ASCII string is presentedout-of-band with respect to a control signal presented to said satellitephone data port.
 7. A method of providing secure communications over anon-secure data network, comprising: capturing a Dial Tone ModulationFrequency (DTMF) tone; demodulating V.34 encrypted modem informationreceived from an encryption device; converting said DTMF tone and saiddemodulate V.34 encrypted modem information into an ASCII string; andpresenting said ASCII string out-of-band with respect to said DTMF toneto a data port of a satellite phone.
 8. The method of providing securecommunications over a non-secure data network according to claim 7,further comprising: alternatively receiving demodulated V.34 informationat a FAX/data interface.
 9. The method of providing securecommunications over a non-secure data network according to claim 7,further comprising: controlling said satellite phone from a secure sideof said encryption device.
 10. The method of providing securecommunications over a non-secure data network according to claim 7,further comprising: controlling a function of a satellite phone directlyfrom a secure side of said encryption device.
 11. The method ofproviding secure communications over a non-secure data network accordingto claim 7, further comprising: presenting said ASCII string out-of-bandwith respect to a control signal presented to said data port of saidsatellite phone.
 12. Apparatus for providing secure communications overa non-secure data network, comprising: means for providing a false dialtone to an encryption device; means for capturing a Dial Tone ModulationFrequency (DTMF) tone; means for demodulating V.34 encrypted modeminformation from a modem; means for converting said DTMF tone and saiddemodulate V.34 encrypted modem information into an ASCII string; andmeans for presenting said ASCII string to a data port of a satellitephone.
 13. The apparatus for providing secure communications over anon-secure data network according to claim 12, further comprising: meansfor alternatively receiving an output from a FAX/data interface.
 14. Theapparatus for providing secure communications over a non-secure datanetwork according to claim 12, further comprising: means for controllingsaid satellite phone from a secure side of said encryption device. 15.The apparatus for providing secure communications over a non-secure datanetwork according to claim 12, further comprising: means for controllinga function of a satellite phone directly from a secure side of saidencryption device.
 16. The apparatus for providing secure communicationsover a non-secure data network according to claim 12, furthercomprising: means for presenting said ASCII string presents said ASCIIstring out-of-band with respect to a control signal presented to saiddata port of said satellite phone.